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for companies especially when other forms of financing become
difficult. Managing liquidity risk is to ensure the banks own
liquidity so that the bank can continue to serve its function.
This balancing act between a bank’s own liquidity and its role
as a liquidity creator, especially in times of financial distress or
crisis, is the focus of this paper. There has been a great deal of
scrutiny on this issue due to the financial crisis that began in
2007 and is still affecting the economy today.
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I.

Introduction

The term liquidity is often used in multiple contexts. An asset’s liquidity can be used to
describe how quickly, easily and costly it is to convert that asset into cash (Berger &
Bouwman, 2008). Liquidity can also be used to describe a company by the amount of
cash or near cash assets a company has; the more liquid assets, the higher a
company’s liquidity. Financial ratios that measure liquidity are referred to as a
company’s liquidity ratios. One such ratio is the current ratio which determines a
company’s ability to pay short term debts as they come due (Van Ness, 2009). Liquidity
risk has many definitions but the one that can be derived from the ratio is the probability
that a company will not be able to pay its short term obligations as they come due. This
inability can lead a company to face serious financial problems. In addition to this,
liquidity risk can also be defined in terms of the counterparty to a transaction. In this
sense the term means the risk inherent in the fact that the counterparty may not be able
to pay or settle the transaction even if they are in good financial standing, because of a
lack of liquidity (Petria & Petria, 2009).

Liquidity risk for a bank is especially prevalent as it is easy for a bank to lose its liquidity
because depositors can withdraw funds when they choose. In addition to depositors,
banks face another way in which their cash reserves can be strained by fulfilling
obligations to companies. These companies have previously established loan
commitments, called credit lines, that can be borrowed from the bank when needed
(Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2007). Historically, runs on banks have shown certain
banks predisposition to liquidity risk and the severity of impact this risk can have on the
2
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economy. This risk is intricately tied to the nature of banking. This is why banks,

governmental entities, and private industry have tried to understand liquidity risk and
implement public policy, regulations, and risk assessment policies to mitigate this risk.

Aside from managing their own liquidity, banks play another role with regards to liquidity
by creating liquidity for the market. Due to the growth of the commercial paper, equity,
and bonds markets in recent decades, the role of banks as the sole provider of capital
to large companies has diminished. This results from companies looking for the type of
financing that best suits their specific needs. Banks still play a largely influential role in
financing. They are a primary issuer of capital to companies who seek loans to fulfill a
portion of their financing needs. Many times they act as the fall-back crutch on which
companies support themselves in times of difficult financing. Companies can do so by
establishing credit lines with banks to secure funding that ensures liquidity when it is
needed most.

In summary, banks face two central issues regarding liquidity. Banks are responsible for
managing liquidity creation and liquidity risk. Liquidity creation helps depositors and
companies stay liquid, for companies especially when other forms of financing become
difficult. Managing liquidity risk is to ensure the bank’s own liquidity so that the bank can
continue to serve its function.

This balancing act between a bank’s own liquidity and its role as a liquidity creator,
especially in times of financial distress or crisis, is the focus of this paper. There has
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been a great deal of scrutiny on this issue due to the financial crisis that began in 2007
and is still affecting the economy today. This paper compares and contrasts several of
the ideas and theories presented in academic literature. Section II will provide a review
of these ideas and theories presented in the literature; Section III will present the
statement of problem; Section IV will present possible solutions and suggestions;
Section V will conclude; Section VI will offer further research suggestions.

II.

Literature Review

Banks own liquidity and their role as a liquidity provider are intricately connected. The
basic relationship is that when banks require more liquidity for themselves, they are able
to provide less liquidity to the market. Obviously this is a simplified relationship. By
holding more liquid assets, banks decrease their liquidity risk. The holding of liquid
assets in excess of requirements is considered a liquidity cushion or buffer which helps
banks in times of increased liquidity pressure to meet these liquidity needs. Having a
liquidity buffer thus lowers the amount of liquidity a bank can create for the market in
normal times. However, as will be discussed, in times of turmoil or crisis this liquidity
buffer can actually increase a bank’s liquidity creation as it may let these banks
capitalize on other banks inability to lend. By creating liquidity in the market, banks
serve an important economic role. If markets go illiquid or “dry up” this can lead to a
decline in business growth as well as put difficult strains on consumers. This is why the
relationship between the two has important effects on the economy and thus has
warranted a great deal of academic attention.
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There are many factors that affect banks own liquidity and in turn affect the amount of
liquidity they can create. These factors have a varying degree of influence on the
balance between liquidity risk and liquidity creation, or a bank’s liquidity management. A
bank’s assets and liabilities play a central role in their balancing of liquidity risk and
creation. A bank’s liabilities include all the banks sources of funds. Banks have three
main sources of funds: deposit accounts, borrowed funds, and long term funds. The
amounts and sources of funds clearly affect how much liquidity risk a bank has and how
much liquidity it can create. The easier a bank can access funds the less risk it has and
the higher amount of funds it holds the more liquidity it can create, if willing to do so.
Deposit accounts are made up of transaction deposits, also known as demand deposits,
savings deposits, time deposits, and money market deposit accounts. The borrowed
funds of a bank come from loans from other banks via the Federal Funds market, loans
from the Federal Reserve Bank, repurchase agreements, and Eurodollar borrowings.
The longer term sources of funds for banks are bonds that banks issue and bank capital
(Madura, 2007).

One group of researchers studied liquidity management by focusing on the liability side
of the balance sheet analyzing demand deposit accounts and the amount of undrawn
credit lines a bank had. These two liabilities are major factors of a bank’s liquidity risk.
Demand deposit accounts give banks a larger cash base and thus are a form of
liquidity. Undrawn credit lines are a liquidity risk that is off the balance sheet; companies
with established credit lines can borrow from banks when they need it and thus
decrease a bank’s liquidity. These two opposing liquidity factors can be analyzed in
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times of financial distress, for example by looking at the Russian default of 1998 and its
after affects. After the Russian default a major trend unfolded: the spread between
Treasury bill paper and commercial paper widened. This signaled investor uncertainty
and affected demand deposit accounts and credit lines. With investors no longer
wanting to invest in commercial paper, many entrusted their money to the banks.
Specifically, investors put this money into demand deposit accounts believing the
market distress would be short lived. This lead to an increase in cash reserves at banks,
and those with more demand deposit accounts enjoyed a more significant increase in
liquidity. However, with companies being unable to refinance their commercial paper, or
forced to refinance at a much higher cost, these companies turned to their preestablished lines of credit for financing. Banks with more undrawn credit lines faced
more liquidity pressure than banks that did not have as many. The 1998 turmoil
provides evidence for two important points. The first is that when investors are uncertain
they tend to flock to banks as a safe haven. This in turn decreases a banks liquidity risk
by increasing their cash on hand. The other is that in times of uncertainty companies
also turn to banks but for the opposite reason: they need financing. This increases a
bank’s liquidity risk but it is also how banks act as liquidity creators. Studies indicate that
banks balance their liquidity risk and their role as a liquidity creator by balancing their
demand deposit accounts and their amount of undrawn credit lines; banks that did so
fared better financially (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2007).

The balancing act for banks between liquidity risk and creation can also be a strategic
decision instead of one solely to meet demands and prevent the bank from failing
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(Acharya, Shin, & Yorulmazer, 2009). When banks face increasing liquidity risk, many

times in the face of financial crisis or turmoil, they also face a downturn in new business.
Banks that have the relatively same inflow of cash through increasing demand deposits
to the outflow of cash due to fulfillment of credit lines will be unable to originate new
loans. A strategic decision a bank can make is to hold more liquidity, or a liquidity
cushion. In “normal” economic times, this will cause banks to miss out to some extent
on new business. However, in tough economic times this liquidity cushion will give
banks a competitive advantage. This is for two main reasons. One main reason is that
banks that have higher liquidity before a crisis will be able to act as a liquidity provider
for companies who do not have credit lines established or who need additional funding
on top of those funds. The second is that the banks that face the most liquidity
pressures and have more cash outflow than inflow will have to sell assets. In this
situation most other banks will be facing increased liquidity pressures and there will be
only a few banks in the market to buy these assets. This lack of liquidity in the market
can lead to fire sales of assets. This means the company looking to sell the assets will
have to offer them at a large discount because it needs the cash now due to liquidity
pressure. Therefore, in crisis periods banks holding more liquidity will be able to both
grow in new business and take over business of other banks by buying their assets at
low prices. By purchasing assets at fire sale prices banks that are the purchaser stand
to make a great deal of profit (Acharya, Shin, & Yorulmazer, 2009). An example of this
can be found in the book Citibank, 1812-1970. The authors explain how National City
Bank used this high liquidity strategy prior to both the crises of 1893 and 1907. This
strategy led to significantly higher growth in new loans and in deposits (Cleveland &
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Huertas, 1985). This means that the bank was able to increase its role as a liquidity
provider and keep its liquidity risk constant. During the recent financial crisis a
somewhat opposing trend played out. Even those banks that experienced an increase
in deposits did not originate new loans and instead placed these deposits with central
banks (Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). This meant that although they were enjoying
an increase in liquidity, they did not want to act as liquidity creators. In essence, the
banks wanted to stockpile their liquidity and thus reduce their liquidity risk instead of
balancing it with liquidity creation. This was mostly due to the uncertainty surrounding
other companies’ creditworthiness.

The amount of exposure a bank has to the real or perceived cause of a financial crisis
has a significant effect on a banks liquidity risk and creation. Banks with a higher degree
of exposure to the cause will face increased liquidity pressure and thus will not be able
to provide as much liquidity to the market. This relationship is evidenced by the near
failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) after the Russian default in 1998.
Firms that were more exposed to LTCM experienced more volatility and a greater drop
in stock prices than those not exposed to the company (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan,
2007). Although stock price is not the focus of this paper, a decrease in stock price will
signal weakness and increase liquidity pressure on any type of company. Many liquidity
pressures can be detailed by examining the current crisis. The degree of exposure
companies and banks faced in the current crisis dealt with the amount of complex
financial products, especially mortgage related products, held by the company and
exposure to firms that came close to or actually did collapse such as Lehmann Brothers
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and Bear Sterns. The crisis has decreased banks willingness to finance loans that use
collateral. This was especially true for those firms who were perceived as being weak
because this weakness could mean being unable to collect on loans issued. Banks that
would continue financing did so with stricter requirements. Difficult to value products
were less likely to be allowed to be used as collateral, increased margins were required,
shorter maturities were imposed, and a general decrease in funding transpired (Senior
Supervisors Group, 2009). This meant that banks were much less willing to be liquidity
providers during the crisis and if they were willing to be providers it was to a lesser
extent.

During the financial crisis the interbank lending market even experienced a significant
decrease. Banks have typically been able to rely on other banks to meet short term
financing shortcomings due to a lack of liquidity. Banks do this through the Federal
Funds market. In this market, banks borrow and lend to each other at a rate roughly .25
to 1.00 percent higher than the Treasury bill rate. The rate is influenced by whether
there are more banks looking to lend excess funds or more banks looking to borrow
excess funds (Madura, 2007). In the current crisis little or no banks were looking to lend
due to their own liquidity pressure. The uncertainty of creditworthiness and exposure to
the cause of the crisis caused banks to become hesitant to lend to other banks. The
drying up of interbank lending again meant banks were unwilling to provide liquidity for
fear of what it might mean for their own liquidity in the future.

9
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A bank’s risk management policy evaluates: the amount of demand deposits versus

undrawn credit lines, the strategic decision of holding higher or lower liquidity cushions,
and companies and other banks creditworthiness, especially those more exposed to a
crisis. Risk managers use many models to account for the level of risk they are taking
and how this affects the firm’s profit and viability in various economic situations. Risk
management policies can however have a spiral effect on the amount of liquidity banks
are willing to provide. When a bank perceives itself as having higher risk, such as
having a higher liquidity risk, it implements stricter risk management policies and will
limit the amount of liquidity they provide. This means there will be less liquidity in the
market. Less liquidity in the market will increase a bank’s risk management policies and
again lead to less liquidity provided by banks (Garleanu & Pedersen, 2007). This
feedback loop can spiral and lead to serious financing difficultly within the market.

Regulations and governmental agencies can significantly influence a bank’s liquidity risk
and its role as a liquidity provider. A factor of bank liquidity risk and creation is whether
or not the bank is publicly traded. Being publicly traded means that a bank must file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The filing requirements are stringent
and include both annual and interim financial information and require financial reporting
to be completed under specific guidelines. This means that banks which are publicly
traded become transparent than banks that are private. Transparency is important
because it means there is less information asymmetry between a bank’s management
and possible lenders to the bank. Lenders are more willing to lend to a bank that has
less information asymmetry and is publicly traded than one that has more information
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asymmetry and is not publicly traded (Holod & Peek, 2006). This means that banks that
are publicly traded and thus more transparent have better access to external financing
(Holod & Peek, 2006). This means publicly traded banks are less likely to have as great
a liquidity risk because they have an additional avenue in which they can access funds
if needed.

The Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) is the central bank for American banks. Its actions are
designed to influence the supply and demand of money, impacting liquidity risk and
creation. It takes actions specifically to manipulate the Federal Funds rate by influencing
the amount of money supply in the banking system. This subsequently affects other
rates in the market as well (Madura, 2007). The tightening of monetary policy by the
FRB has significant effects on a banks liquidity risk and creation. When the FRB
tightens monetary policy banks face a decline in the amount of deposits they hold
(Holod & Peek, 2006). In particular, these deposits are the ones held for reserves in
order to meet regulatory requirements as many banks do not hold excess reverses. If
banks were holding excess reserves prior to the tightening of monetary policy it means
they can no longer use these reserves to provide liquidity when such an opportunity
presents itself. If not holding excess reserves, the banks themselves must raise
additional capital. One way banks can do this is to sell liquid securities that they hold.
Another option is to sell more illiquid assets, such as loans, which is not preferable to
banks because they are forced to sell these assets at a reduced rate and face a
potentially adverse effect on lending relations (Holod & Peek, 2006). Banks can also
raise the cash by increasing the liability side of the balance sheet. This is a common
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way in which banks deal with the tightening of monetary policy. They raise the funds

mainly through uninsured large time deposits (Holod & Peek, 2006). Time deposits are
deposits that not allowed to be withdrawn from the bank until a specific date (Madura,
2007). These time deposits guarantee banks liquidity for a specific and measureable
amount of time. The tightening of monetary policy means banks must raise additional
cash or decrease the amount of excess cash they held, meaning they are unable to
provide as much liquidity as before.

The bailout policy by the FRB also greatly influences banks liquidity balance. Acharya,
Shin and Yorulmazer target three different policies regarding bailouts and analyze their
effects on liquidity management. The three different policies are providing liquidity
support to failed banks, providing unconditional support to surviving banks, and
providing conditional liquidity to surviving banks based on the percentage of liquid
assets in their portfolio. They found that providing support to failed banks, or providing
bailouts, will decrease a bank’s motivation to hold liquid assets. In this scenario banks
that survive will have no opportunity to buy up the assets of a failed bank at the low fire
sale prices because these banks won’t be allowed to fail. This will therefore decrease
the reason for any bank to hold liquid assets because there is no strategic advantage in
doing so. In the next scenario, the researchers found that when the FRB supports banks
that survive unreservedly, this also decreases the motivation for banks to hold liquid
assets. This is because support guarantees the banks that do survive the capital
needed to purchase assets at fire sale prices and eliminates the need to worry about
holding liquid assets that they can convert quickly to cash to do so. This effect is
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especially true for large banks that are “too big to fail” because they need not worry
about the possibility of failing either. The third policy examined concerns providing
liquidity support to banks based on the amount of liquid assets they already hold in their
portfolio. This policy increases a banks incentive to hold liquid assets. The banks
holding the highest percentage of liquid assets will receive the most support and thus be
able to purchase the most assets at fire sale prices. By providing bailouts or
unconditional support the FRB increases the likelihood that banks will not hold liquid
assets and therefore have higher liquidity risk. Similar research shows that banks have
motivation to be illiquid if others are also illiquid, but liquid if others are also liquid
(Ratnovski, 2007). The explanation for this is that if all banks are illiquid than support
from the FRB is more likely. However if one bank is liquid and the other is not, then the
support for the failing bank will be much less certain because the need to support the
failing bank to keep the economy running smoothly will not be as urgent (Ratnovski,
2007).

As evidenced in the previously discussed literature, a banks’ liquidity tends to be
counter-cyclic. This means that bank liquidity is low in normal economic times but high
in tough economic times, such as crises. A study of U.K. banks from 1983-2003 found
that this was accurate and that an approximately 1% increase in GDP lead to an
approximately 2% decrease in banks liquidity (Aspachs, Nier, & Tiesset, 2004). This
means that in order to ensure its own liquidity, banks do not provide liquidity to the
market. This also means when many companies need it most banks do not act as a
provider of liquidity.
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Another interesting study examines not what banks do during a crises involving liquidity
management but what banks have done before such crises. By studying five crises,
three market crises and two banking crises, research suggests that there was either too
much or too little liquidity creation before all of these crises. However, this idea
remained non-conclusive (Berger & Bouwman, 2008). What was most interesting was
the data surrounding the current economic crisis. Prior to and during the first portion of
the current crisis, the data shows an abnormally high build-up of liquidity creation by
banks. Berger and Bouwman refer to this as the “dark side” of liquidity. The idea states
that banks may have created too much liquidity in the market and this is what led to
such lax lending standards, too much available credit and too many credit lines. This
idea is somewhat contradictory to the assumption that too little liquidity causes financial
vulnerability and instead posits that too much liquidity can also cause financial
vulnerability.

III.

Statement of Problem

The problem with bank liquidity management is that when banks get it wrong, there can
be drastic consequences for the economy. This can be seen today from the continuing
effects of what started in 2007. The economy is still in a rut and although Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) has once again begun to pick up, unemployment remains at
the extremely high level of 9.7% according to the most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics
Report (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). A key issue to ensure progress has to be how
to make sure banks successfully balance their liquidity management in order to be
14
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stable and still provide the market with liquidity. Public policy makers will aim to continue
strong national economic growth while keeping low unemployment and inflation. Banks
themselves have a motive to ensure stability and also increase profits. Economies for
years have struggled with liquidity risk. The sheer size and complexity of the modern
economy increases the importance of this issue and this is all the more reason it needs
to be carefully considered.

IV.

Possible solutions

Since the crisis began banks have been under close scrutiny. Regulatory bodies and
private industry have been observing banks’ behavior and have intervened to make
suggestions on changes in best practices. They have also begun to evaluate how these
banks are implementing changes.

Internal risk management changes in banks are a key aspect of improving bank liquidity
management in the years to come. The role of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is an
important area targeted by many banks. Traditionally the monitoring of liquidity risk was
under the umbrella of the treasury department of banks. Banks plan on integrating the
CRO and their team with the treasury department to monitor liquidity risk in the future
(Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). This will improve oversight and coordination which
was a problem because many banks before the crisis did not have a specific limit for or
acceptable level of liquidity risk. This will change as banks need to clearly articulate to
the entire organization what their strategy is regarding risk.
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To fully achieve articulation, banks will need to make sure they are capable of

measuring their liquidity risk. The lack of pertinent data on risks was cited by not only
banks but many financial services firms as key to better liquidity and risk management
(EYGM Limited, 2009). The information systems in place failed to recognize key risks.
Without timely and accurate data, banks continue to struggle to understand the true
depths of the liquidity risk and thus will be unable to know optimal level of liquidity
creation.

Hand in hand with more accurate data go more accurate risk models. These models will
need to be able to better assess the difficulties the bank will face. This will mean more
dramatic and gloomy assumptions about the banks conditions, the entire economy’s
condition, and the length of time of the downturn (Economist, 2009). As presented, a
key aspect of a bank’s liquidity risk and creation are deposits. Therefore banks will need
to test these deposits. This will be in order to determine which deposits are likely to
remain at the bank and which ones will go elsewhere when economic conditions change
(Senior Supervisors Group, 2009). Banks will need to dissect their business models in
terms of sources of funding (EYGM Limited, 2009). As evidenced in the literature, banks
could not even rely on financing that traditionally was near fail safe such as the Federal
Funds market. Banks have rediscovered the strategic implications and beneficial
impacts of larger liquidity cushions and most banks will need to increase these buffers.

Banks alone cannot be expected to fully balance their liquidity risk and creation. They
face a conflict of interest and unless given incentive to act otherwise will make sure their
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own liquidity risk is taken care of before worrying about liquidity creation for the market.
As discussed with the spiral effect there indeed may be incentive for banks to supply
liquidity to halt the continued tightening and illiquidity in the market but this alone may
not be enough. Public policy makers and regulators including the FRB must examine
their policies to determine how to effectively make banks liquidity management achieve
banks and markets needs.

Public policy makers and regulators need to begin by reexamining existing policies and
regulations. This will enable them to better understand where policies and regulations
currently stand and the effectiveness of them. An immediate priority should be capital
requirement. This clearly effects how much of a liquidity buffer banks are required to
hold and also will influence how much liquidity a bank can create. A major problem
identified in the literature is the counter-cyclic nature of liquidity holdings by banks and
as a result, liquidity creation. A possible solution could include regulations that would
incentivize banks to hold higher liquidity buffers in normal times. Instead of hoarding
liquidity in times of crisis, this solution would incentivize banks to provide liquidity to the
markets when illiquidity is a cause of stress. This could also help with the abnormal
build up of liquidity prior to the crisis that was identified as a probable cause of the
crisis. By holding higher liquidity in normal times this would decrease the amount of
liquidity creation in the market and thus keep the economy from overheating. This is
parallel with the philosophy of William McChesney Martin Jr. on the role of the FRB, “To
take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going” and also would implement
putting the punch bowl back when the party started to die.
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A main policy for the FRB to assess is its bailout policy especially in light of the vast
amount of current bailouts. The FRB’s actions will need to be closely scrutinized.
Certain research points to bailout policy being a main cause of illiquidity in banks. The
FRB should certainly consider the idea of providing support based on the amount of
liquid assets a bank holds and weigh the effects this would have on banks. This could
indeed incentivize banks to hold more liquid assets and address the issue of too much
liquidity being counterproductive.

It is a difficult balance between liquidity risk for a bank and liquidity creation for the
markets. Banks will be naturally inclined to serve their own interest and this is why
regulators must attempt to counter act this to keep the economy running smoothly.

V.

Conclusion

Banks must change how to balance their liquidity risk and their role as liquidity
providers, restructuring liquidity management. Liquidity risk exposes banks to financial
hardship. Banks attempt to control liquidity risk factors by balancing cash inflows and
outflows and some even hold liquidity cushions for strategic purposes. When crisis hits,
banks limit their exposure to firms connected to the cause and these firms, including
banks, will fare worse. Being exposed to too much liquidity risk can leave banks to face
fleeing investors, depositor runs, ratings downgrades, and tougher financing. These
consequences are what banks wish to avoid and why they implement policies to protect
themselves from liquidity risk. This is also why when banks face the choice of lowering
18
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their liquidity risk, especially in times of crisis, or providing liquidity to the market they

will act to protect themselves first and foremost. Banks therefore tend to provide liquidity
in counter-cyclic ways: too much when the economy is running hot and too little when
the economy takes a turn for the worst. This tends to exacerbate the problem for both
banks and the economy. Economies have seen this play out before and entities
including banks and regulations have tried to learn from these crises. This has led to the
establishment of regulations and internal policies to try to stem such crises. Regulators
policies, such as bailing out failed banks and decisions about monetary policy, can
greatly influence liquidity risk and creation. However, as evidenced by the current crisis,
these steps seem to have failed to be up to the task of ensuring balance between the
two. Banks should now return to more conservative policies and aim to improve cracks
in their systems including improvement of information systems and more accurate
models with more realistic assumptions. Regulators have their work cut out as well.
They need to find a way to prevent the counter-cyclic trends of banks and ensure that
actions by banks, although meant to secure their own liquidity, don’t actually make
matters worse for all parties.

VI.

Suggestions for Future Research

As banks and regulators change policies there will be a need to evaluate such policies
before crisis strikes in an attempt to prevent or limit the intensity of crises. Empirical
analyses of the regulators actions and there effects are future research possibilities.
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